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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal presents a collateral attack on the entry of the magistrate court's 2005 decree

that purportedly granted Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird a divorce, and that was the basis for the
later judgment that divided community property. The Appellant Dennis argues that because he
and Renee's attempted 1996 Oregon marriage was never valid under that State's law, it was
never valid under Idaho law. Consequently, there was never a marriage "res" over which the
magistrate court could exercise any subject matter jurisdiction either to dissolve the parties' nonexistent marriage in 2005, or to later determine, and then to divide, non-existent community
property in 2012. This appeal is brought from the 2012 community property judgment.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
There is no requirement in Idaho law which establishes that as a "condition precedent,"

(LR.C.P. 9(c», to the commencement ofa divorce action that the parties must actually plead the
existence of a valid marriage. Therefore, as based upon the alleged marriage between Renee
Baird and Dennis Sallaz that had occurred in the State of Oregon on July 4, 1996, Renee filed a
complaint for divorce in Fourth District Ada County court on May 27 2004 (R, pp. 13-16). A
decree granting the divorce was entered July 28,2005, which decree reserved the "community
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property" and "community debt" issues for later trial (R, pp. 23-24; See, Finding of Fact No.1,
R, pg. 127).
The ensuing resolution of the parties' "community property" and "community debt"
issues involved sixteen days of trial and was conducted over a nine month period, including
November 15 through 19,2005; April 10 through 14,2006; July 17 through 21,2006; and July
27,2006. There were several hundred exhibits admitted into evidence, many of which were of
substantial length (R, pg. 126).
The magistrate court's initial Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were
issued October 30, 2007 (R, pp. 25-67). In July 2008 both parties filed motions to amend the
magistrate court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (R, p. 82-96). These motions
were heard by the magistrate court in a series of hearings that occurred between September 2008
and May 2009. The magistrate court issued an order on the motions to amend on July 20,2009,
and issued an order of amendment on those motions on July 29,2009 (R, 97-125).
Two and a half years passed before the magistrate court issued its Amended Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, and the Amended Final Judgment on January 4,2012 (R,
pp. 126-172). The reasons for this delay were stated by the magistrate court on page 2 of those
Amended Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law (R, pg. 127).
The Appellant Sallaz filed a timely appeal to the district court from the entry of the
January 4, 2012 judgment on February 9,2012 (R, pp. 193-196). Following the decision of the
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district court on intermediate appeal (R, pp. 349-360), a timely appeal to this Court was filed on
August 8, 2013 (R, pp. 361-65).
Two post-judgment occurrences have significantly affected the issues that are raised on
this appeal. First, the Plaintiff/Respondent Renee Baird filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition. See, In Re: Renee L. Baird, Case No.l2-00904-JDP, (United State Bankruptcy Court,
D.Ida.) (R. pp. 199-204). As a consequence of that filing, it was necessary for the
Defendant!Appellant, Dennis Sallaz, to obtain an order from the Bankruptcy Court to lift the
automatic stay in order to proceed with the appeal before the district court, along with this appeal
(R, pg. 231-33). Then, once the appeal before the district court was perfected, the bankruptcy
trustee filed a motion to intervene in that appeal (R, pp. 205-208).
Because community property issues, in which the bankruptcy trustee had a bona fide
interest, were actually raised on the intermediate appeal to the district court (R, pg. 250), the
Appellant Sallaz did not object to the trustee's participation as to those issues (R, pg. 210). But
at the same time, the Appellant Sallaz also noted a challenge had been made to the validity of the
Oregon marriage by way of an independent action filed in Fourth District Court, Ada County,
and in that respect, that action also raised the question of the trustee being somewhat, "illequipped to proceed as the real party in interest in the place of Ms. Baird on these questions
concerning the scope and extent of the marital estate that existed between herself and the
Appellant Sallaz" (R, pg. 210).
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The second post-judgment occurrence that has affected the issues that are raised in this
appeal has been set out in the affidavit of Dennis J. Sallaz that was submitted to district court CR,
pp.216-221). In that affidavit the Appellant Sallaz describes how he learned for the first time
that Respondent Baird had been "boasting about getting her 'community property' from me even
though she had never married me." Sallaz Aff., ~ 7, (R, pg. 217). Upon further investigation, the
Appellant Sallaz determined that no Oregon marriage license ever existed (R, pp. 281-82).
Consequently, on that basis alone, the parties' alleged marriage would be invalid under Idaho
law as a consequence of the absence of any valid marriage license Dire v. Dire-Blodgett, 140
Idaho 777, 102 P.3d 1096 (2004).
An independent action, already referred to above, was therefore commenced to determine
the validity of the Sallaz marriage (Sallaz v. Sallaz, Fourth Dist. Ada County Case No. CV OC
12-17666). The bankruptcy trustee's petition to intervene in that action was granted (R, pp. 34345), as was his immediate motion to then dismiss that action, on the basis that it was an
impermissible collateral attack upon the January 4,2012 judgment, out of which this appeal
arises (R, pp. 339-40).
Within the intermediate appeal to the district court, that court was also requested to issue
a temporary remand to the magistrate court, if it was deemed that the record before the district
court was inadequate to determine the subject matter jurisdiction question presented on that
appeal as to the necessity of a valid marriage in order to decree a divorce and divide community
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property (R, pg. 258). The district court declined, perceived to be done primarily on the grounds
of some concept of "estoppel" (R, pp. 350-53).
After the appellate record was settled on this appeal, the Appellant Sallaz filed two
motions, both of which were denied by this Court. Sallaz again requested remand to the
magistrate court to fully develop the factual record as to the validity of the marriage. Sallaz also
made a binding-declaration that unlike the intermediate appeal to the district court, where he had
actually raised issues and challenged the actual division of community property, in this appeal he
needed only going challenge the validity of the marriage itself. Therefore, in that context, Sallaz
questioned the continued right of the bankruptcy trustee to participate in this appeal, since the
state of existence of a marriage itself does not constitute "property of the bankruptcy estate."
Unlike the intermediate appeal before the district court, on which three discrete issues
were presented to the court, two of which directly challenged the magistrate court's division of
community property (R, pg. 250), in this appeal only one question is being presented to this
Court. If the parties were never married under Idaho law, then there was never any community
property, and all community property issues are thereby eliminated. Therefore the question of
the validity of the marriage only really needs to be presented to this Court.
If this Court should determine a valid marriage exists (somehow under Idaho law), the
magistrate's property determinations in the divorce were so entangled with third party interests
Real Homes LLC, Daryl Sallaz, Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., Steve Sumner, and so on, - those

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - PAGE 11

third party interests - as they so choose - can separately bring independent actions to
collaterally challenge the magistrate court's determinations which have allegedly affected their
individual interests, when they were not a party to the action.
In a final gesture of full candor, the Appellant Sallaz believes he has been more than
forthcoming through the presentation of the filing of his pre-briefing motions, in alerting both the
Office of the Trustee of the Bankruptcy Court, and this Court, as to the nature and extent of the
issues intended by the effects of this appeal. No one is being ambushed or blind-sided by any
sudden abandonment of issues that directly relate to "property of the bankruptcy estate." The
decision of the Trustee to proceed in this appeal was with full disclosure of the nature and extent
of the issues to be presented by Appellant.

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because the only issue raised in this appeal goes to the validity of the parties' 1996

Oregon "marriage", there is little in the record on appeal to present in this Statement of Facts.
As noted above in the outline of the Proceedings Below, Appellant Sallaz, since the discovery
that his Oregon marriage was invalid, had made an effort to commence an independent action to
place that question at issue, and had requested both the district court, on intermediate appeal, and
this Court, to remand for further development of the factual record. If the factual record is
sparse, it is not due to the lack of any effort by the Appellant Sallaz to augment that record.
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As declared on the face of the divorce complaint, the parties were allegedly married on
July 4, 1996 in Oregon (R., pg. 14). As indicated by the attachment provided in Appendix A to
the Appellant's Brief, on the intermediate appeal to the district court, the state of Oregon has
confirmed there is no record of any such marriage in any of its counties, or of record with its
Oregon Department of Vital Statistics, most specifically, there is no record of a "marriage
license" (R., pp. 281-82).
As based upon the Affidavit of Dennis J. Sallaz, filed in Baird-Sallaz v. Sallaz, Fourth
District, Ada County Case No. 04-01075 D on September 28,2012, the individual who
"solemnized" their marriage, Rick Willard, had no authority under Oregon law, and the
necessary documentation required by Oregon law was never obtained or filed, making that
Oregon marriage void ab initio. Sallaz Aff.,

~'r

3-11. Failing to be valid under Oregon law, that

marriage could not be recognized under Idaho law. I.C. § 32-209.

D.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction presents a question oflaw over which an

appellate court exercises free review. State v. Peterson, 153 Idaho 157, 160,280 P.3d 184, 187
(Ct.App.2012). A defect in subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, including for
the first time on appeal. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 832,264 P.3d 935, 939 (2011).
A court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by a party, and the parties
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cannot consent to the court's assumption of jurisdiction, whether through conduct or
acquiescence, nor be estopped from asserting its absence. State v. Bosier, 149 Idaho 664, 666,
239 P.3d 462,464 (Ct.App. 2010). Because courts are obligated to ensure their own subject
matter jurisdiction, that question must be raised and addressed "sua sponte" by the court itself, if
and when necessary. In re City ofShelley, 151 Idaho 289, 294, 255 P.3d 1175,1180 (2011).
A judgment that has been entered by a court without subject matter jurisdiction is void,
and can be challenged at any time, including a collateral attack. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho
283,291,221 P.3d 81,89 (2009). Relief from a void judgment is not discretionary. McClure

Engineering, Inc., v. Channel 5 KIDA, 143 Idaho 950, 953, 155 P.3d 1189, 1192 (Ct.App.2006).
A void judgment can be attacked at any time by any person adversely affected by it. Cuevas v.

Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 894,277 P.3d 337,341 (2012).
When a required valid and lawfully established marriage never existed in the first
instance, then no subject matter jurisdiction exists in any court to dissolve that non-existent
marriage. See e.g., Cannon v. Cannon, 677 N.E.2d 566,567 (Ind.App.1997); In the Matter of

Marriage ofJB. and HE., 326 S.W.3d 654,667 (Tex.App.2010); and Van Der Stappen v. Van
Der Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Utah App.1991).
When subject jurisdiction does exist, that portion of a decree that has granted the divorce
itself will be upheld, even though a portion of that decree must be set aside because it is void for
lack of personal jurisdiction over third parties, or due to its lack of subject matter jurisdiction
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over certain subject property addressed by the court Wood v. Wood, 100 Idaho 387, 389, 597
P.2d 1077 (1979).

II.
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did a valid marriage exist between Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird upon which
the magistrate court was entitled to exercise subject matter jurisdiction to divide
the purported community property allegedly owned by those parties in granting
the Amended Final Judgment and Decree which was entered on January 4, 2012?

III.
ARGUMENT
A.

In The Absence Of A Valid Marriage "Res" The Magistrate Court Had No
Subject Matter Jurisdiction To Take Any Action - To Either Dissolve The
Parties' Non-Existent Marriage, Or To Later Determine And Then Divide
Non-Existent Community Property
This appeal arises directly from the magistrate court's January 4,2012 judgment that

determined and divided the parties' "community property" CR, pp. 173-192). That 2012
judgment was in turn necessarily derived, and dependent upon, the underlying July 28, 2005
divorce decree CR, pp. 23-24). The magistrate court in its Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law declared that the issues of property and debt division had been retained for
trial after the entry ofthe divorce decree CR, pg. 127).
In this appeal Appellant Sallaz argues that because he and Respondent Baird failed to
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enter into a valid marriage in the state of Oregon on July 4, 1996, no marriage "res" ever came
into existence. In the absence of a valid marriage entered into under Oregon law, that could be
recognized under Idaho law, I.C. § 32-209, the magistrate court below lacked the required
subject matter jurisdiction to either enter a decree of divorce, Dire v. Dire-Blodgett, 140 Idaho
777, 779, 102 P.3d 1096, 1098 (2004) ("They were never married. Therefore, the magistrate
judge correctly dismissed Dire's divorce action."), or to determine and divide the parties' nonexistent community property ( I.e. §§ 32-712, 32-713, 32-714, 32-903, and 32-906).
This Court is requested to vacate both the January 4,2012 community property judgment,
and the July 28,2005 divorce decree upon which that community property judgment was based
and derived, on the grounds there was a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Because the magistrate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the resulting judgments
were void. Because the judgments were void, they are now subject to collateral attack. On the
intermediate appeal below the Appellant Sallaz cited recent authority in support of his argument
that the questions of subject matter jurisdiction, and the collateral attack upon a judgment entered
without subject matter jurisdiction, can be brought at any time, including for the first time on
appeal (R, pp. 320-22, 326-29). These arguments appear to have been essentially ignored by the
district court (R, pp. 350-53).
Therefore, that same authority is again cited here, and Sallaz further argues that existing Idaho
law, along with past Idaho precedent, and current Idaho public policy, support his argument that

APPELLANT'S BRIEF -PAGE 16

his appeal presents a question of subject matter jurisdiction for the court to decide.
Collateral attacks upon void judgments are specifically permitted under Idaho law, as
declared by the Idaho Supreme Court in Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 277 P.3d 337 (2012):
Generally, "final judgments, whether right or wrong, are not subject to
collateral attack." Kukuruza v. Kukuruza, 120 Idaho 630, 632, 818 P.2d 334,336
(Ct.App. 1991) (emphasis original). However, a void judgment can be
attacked at any time by any person adversely affected by it. Burns v. Baldwin,
138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502,508 (2003). This Court "narrowly construe[s]
what constitutes a void judgment." Hartman v. United Heritage Prop. & Cas.
Co., 141 Idaho 193, 197, 108 P.3d 340,344 (2005).
In order for a judgment to be void, there must generally be some
jurisdictional defect in the court's authority to enter the judgment, either
because the court lacks personal jurisdiction or because it lacks
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Puphal v. Puphal, 105
Idaho 302, 669 P.2d 191 (1983). A judgment is also void where it is
entered in violation of due process because the party was not given notice
and an opportunity to be heard. Prather v. Loyd, 86 Idaho 45,382 P.2d
910 (1963) ...
Id. (quoting McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 558, 82 P.3d 833,840 (2003)).
See also Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 291, 221 P.3d 81, 89 (2009) ....
153 Idaho at 894, 277 P.3d at 341 (emphasis added).
A judgment that has been entered by a court without subject matter jurisdiction is void,
and can be challenged at any time, including a collateral attack. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho
283,291,221 P.3d 81,89 (2009). Relief from a void iudgment is not discretionary. McClure
Engineering, Inc., v. Channel 5 KlDA, 143 Idaho 950, 953, 155 P.3d 1189, 1192 (Ct.App.2006).
Because an issue concerning absence of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised for the first time
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on appeal, relief from a void judgment also can be requested and granted on appeal. See e.g.,

Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 286 n. 10, 207 P .3d 1008,
1017 n. 10 (2009).
Over the years, through long-standing practice and precedent, issues of "jurisdiction"
have "predominated" in Idaho divorce litigation. See e.g., Vierstra v. Vierstra, 153 Idaho 873,
880,292 P.3d 264, 271 (2012) ("This Court has previously held that a divorce decree is final and
'no jurisdiction exists to modify property provisions of a divorce decree.' Barley v. Smith, 149
Idaho 171, 178,233 P.3d 102, 109 (2010) (quoting McBride v. McBride, 112 Idaho 959, 961,
739 P.2d 258,260 (1987))." See also, Fix v. Fix, 125 Idaho 372, 376,870 P.2d 1331, 1335
(Ct.App.1993) (discussing the distinctions between the continuing jurisdiction on custody and
support issues and the res judicata effect on any non-appealed property issues).
In Wood v. Wood, 100 Idaho 387, 597 P.2d 1077 (1979) the Idaho Supreme Court upheld
a judgment granting the dissolution of the marriage itself, based upon the existence of subj ect
matter jurisdiction over the marriage "res," while reversing the remainder of the decree on
matters concerning custody, support, and the division of community property, due to its absence
of personal jurisdiction. In reaching this result, the Court held:
However, the district court did not need in personam jurisdiction over the
wife in order to dissolve the parties' marriage. A divorce action is classified as an
action in rem or quasi in rem and substituted service authorizes such proceedings.
Newell v. Newell, 77 Idaho 355,298 P.2d 663 (1956), cert. den. 352 U.S. 871, 77
S.Ct. 91, 1 L.Ed.2d 76. If a judgment is only void in part and such void portion
can be separated from the balance, relief may be granted to that extent. ...

APPELLANT'SBRIEF -PAGE 18

100 Idaho at 389,597 P.2d at 1079.
In essence, the holding of Wood was to the effect that the court had the necessary subject
matter jurisdiction to dissolve the parties' marriage, even though it lacked the necessary personal
jurisdiction to resolve the other issues. In Donaldson v. Donaldson, 111 Idaho 951, 956, 729
P.2d 426,431 (Ct.App.1986), the Idaho Court of Appeals declared that, "Historically,
jurisdiction over the marital status has been held to exist wherever one of the parties is
domiciled. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942). In
many states, including Idaho, the marital status has been treated as though it were a "res" that
follows each party from one domicile to another. ... " See also, Dire v. Dire-Blodgett, 140 Idaho
777, 779, 102 P.3d 1096, 1098 (2004) ("They were never married. Therefore, the magistrate
judge correctly dismissed Dire's divorce action.").
Within the title and chapter of Idaho Code on divorce actions, jurisdiction over those
actions was addressed in section 32-715:
32-715. Jurisdiction of actions. - Exclusive original jurisdiction of all
actions and proceedings under this chapter is in the district court, but a judge
thereof at chambers may make all necessary orders to carry out the provisions of
this chapter; and the powers and jurisdiction granted district judges by section 1901 shall apply to proceedings under this chapter. 1
The cross-referenced section 1-901 was repealed almost 40 years ago in 1975,
see, 1975 Ida.Sess.L., ch. 242, § 1. Repealed § 1-901 addressed the jurisdiction of judges at
chambers, and the probable reference here was to subsection 11, which declared, "To exercise all
powers expressly conferred upon a judge by any statute of this state, as contradistinguished from
the court." This legislative delegation of "exclusive original jurisdiction" to the district courts has
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In the exercise of this subject matter jurisdiction by an Idaho court, there is only one way that a
"marriage," which is otherwise recognized as valid under Idaho law, can be dissolved by that
court, and that is as declared in subsection 2 of I.C. § 32-601:
32-601. Dissolution of marriage. - Marriage is dissolved onlv:
1. By the death of one of the parties; or,
2. By the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction decreeing a
divorce of the parties.
(Emphasis added). The division of the parties' community property upon divorce is addressed in
I.C. §§ 32-712, 32-713, and 32-714. That community property only exists, ifthe parties have
entered into a valid marriage. I.C. § 32-903 ("All property ... owned ... before marriage ...
shall remain his or her sole and separate property") and I.C. § 32-906 ("All other property
acquired after marriage ... is community property") (emphasis added).
A court's initial acquisition of the required subject matter jurisdiction to determine and
divide the parties' alleged community property interests requires the establishment of two
factors. First, the actual existence of a "de jure" marriage itself under Idaho law, which is
sometimes is being referred to as "the marriage res." I.C. §§ 32-201 & 32-301. Second,
personal jurisdiction over the parties to the alleged marriage within that divorce action in order to
divide the community property. I.C. § 32-712; Wood v. Wood, supra.
been largely subdelegated to the magistrate division of those courts. See, I.C. § 1-2208; and
LR.C.P. 82(c)(1) & (2).
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If the first factor - the existence of a valid marriage itself - is not established, then there
can be no community property whatsoever to divide. Stewart v. Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 677,
152 P .3d 544, 548 (2007) ("Any division of property in a divorce proceeding begins with the
presumption that all property acquired after marriage is community property."). Nor does a court
in a divorce action have any authority to award the separate property of either party to the other
party Schneider v. Schneider, 151 Idaho 415, 426-27, 258 P.3d 350,361-62 (2011).
In this case, the second factor - personal jurisdiction over the parties - is mentioned
simply for the purpose of illustrating that subject matter jurisdiction must first exist in order to
dissolve a marriage.
In this case, after the magistrate court entered its January 4,2012 judgment dividing the
parties' community property, evidence then emerged that a valid marriage under Oregon law had
never existed between Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird that could be recognized under Idaho law
(R, pp. 216-220). In the absence of a valid marriage under Idaho law, no community property
ever existed to be divided in that January 4,2012 judgment. I.e. §§ 32-903 and 32-906.
In the absence of a valid marriage under Idaho law, no marriage "res" ever existed, such
that the court had no subject matter jurisdiction to either dissolve the non-existent marriage or to
identify and divide non-existent community property Wood v. Wood, 100 Idaho 387, 597 P.2d
1077 (1979). Likewise, there is no jurisdiction found to exist in a divorce proceeding for the
court to award the separate property of one party to the other party. Schneider v. Schneider, 151
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Idaho 415, 426-27, 258 P.3d 350, 361-62 (2011); Pringle v. Pringle, 109 Idaho 1026, 1028, 712
P.2d 727, 729 (Ct.App. 1985).
On intermediate appeal, the district court rejected Appellant Sallaz's subject matter
jurisdiction challenge on the basis that (1) subject matter jurisdiction only relates to the general
authority of a court to entertain a certain type of action; that (2) Sallaz is estopped from now
challenging the validity of the marriage after having previously asserted the validity of the
marriage; and that (3) this issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (R, pp. 351-53).
On the direct question of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court relied on
Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 90 P.3d 321 (2004) in which a
magistrate had declared an earlier child support order "to be void because the Housels were still
married and not legally separated when the order was entered" 140 Idaho at 100,90 P.3d at 325.
The Court determined that I.C. § 56-203A authorized the Department of Health and Welfare to
bring an action for support in cases of abandonment or nonsupport, even if the children's parents
were neither divorced, nor separated.
Ultimately, the Court held that even if the magistrate had been correct - there was no
authority to award child support if the parents were married - the judgment would still not be
void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In reaching this conclusion the Court reasoned as
follows:
During the October 2, 2001, hearing, the magistrate stated that the
December 14, 1998 child support order was void since such an order could not be
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issued where the parents are married and not legally separated. Even if this
statement were correct, the December 14, 1998 default order would be merely
erroneous. "A judgment that incorrectly interprets a rule of law does not divest
the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties." Gordon, 118
Idaho at 807,800 P.2d at 1021 (citing Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v. Kirk, 109
Idaho 589, 710 P.2d 18 (Ct.App.l985)). "Jurisdiction is the power to decide
erroneously as well as correctly." 20 AM.JUR. 2d Courts § 59 (1995). '''If the
judgment is erroneous, the unsuccessful party's remedy is to have it set aside or
reversed in the original proceeding.'" Brown's, 109 Idaho at 591,710 P.2d at 20
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 cmt. d (1982)).
Because no appeal was taken from the original order of child support, it was error
for the magistrate to void the order some three years after the fact. Otherwise
there would be no finality to judgments entered if the same or a different judge
determined that there had been a misapplication of the law regardless ofthe time
that had elapsed and the reliance that had been placed on the judgment. It is clear
that the decision of the magistrate setting aside the earlier default judgment did so
on the basis that it was void because of a perceived misapplication of the law.
The magistrate erred in declaring the December 14, 1998, order void.
140 Idaho at 101,90 P.3d at 326.
What seems to emerge from the facts of the Housel decision is a question of entitlement.
There didn't seem to be any dispute about the fact that the three children whose welfare was at
issue were in fact neglected or abandoned, but instead the only question was whether the
Department had authority to seek a support order when those children's parents were neither
divorced, nor separated? This aspect of the case separates and clearly distinguishes it from the
facts that are presented in this case, which had implicated the, "kind and character," inquiry
under subject matter jurisdiction that had been set out in another excerpt from the Housel
decision:
The next question is whether the magistrate court lacked subject matter
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jurisdiction. "Subject matter jurisdiction is the right and abstract power of
the tribunal to exercise power over cases of the kind and character of the one
pending." Young Elec. Sign Co. v. State, 135 Idaho 804, 809,25 P.3d 117, 122
(2001) (quoting Knight v. Dep't of Ins. , 124 Idaho 645,649,862 P.2d 337,341
(Ct.App.1993)). "Lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time."
Fisher v. Crest Corp., 112 Idaho 741, 744, 735 P.2d 1052, 1055 (Ct.App.1987)
(citation omitted). This Court has narrowly construed the ability to void a
judgment, however, on the basis of a defect in a court's subject matter
jurisdiction. As the Court explained in Gordon v. Gordon:
In the sound interest of finality, the concept of void judgment must be
narrowly restricted. And it is.
By jurisdiction over the subject matter the cases mean that the court must
have jurisdiction or power to deal with the class of cases in which it
renders judgment. ... In brief, then, except for the rare case where power
is plainly usurped, if a court has the general power to adjudicate the issues
in the class of suits to which the case belongs its interim orders and final
judgments, whether right or wrong, are not subject to collateral attack, so
far as jurisdiction over the subject matter is concerned.
118 Idaho 804, 807,800 P.2d 1018, 1021 (1990) (quoting 7 Moore's Federal
Practice and Procedure, ,-r 60.25[2], p. 60-225-230 (1990)) (emphasis in original).
140 Idaho at 326,90 P.3d at 326 (emphasis added).
The Court in Housel was declaring that notwithstanding the magistrate court's error with
respect to authority of the Department of Health and Welfare to order support for children, where
parents are neither divorced nor separated, that because the court's actions with respect to "child
support - although erroneous

was nonetheless within the scope of its subject matter jurisdiction

under the "kind and character" test.
An altogether different matter is presented here for this Court's decision. At least three
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problems arise if Housel were to be applied to the facts before this Court, upon the same
rationalization as it was applied in Housel. First, as addressed in Dire v. Dire-Blodgett, 140
Idaho 777, 102 P.3d 1096 (2004), such a holding will result in a judicial revival of "common
law" marriage, in direct contravention of the 1996 legislative determination that such marriages
could no longer be created or recognized after that date under Idaho law. Second, it would place
Idaho within the very small list of states that recognize a doctrine of "marriage by estoppel",
being itself a variation of a common law type-of- marriage. See e.g., Guzman v. Alvares, 205
S.W.3d 375,379-882 (Tenn. 2006). Third, a significant body of existing Idaho precedent,
which has always been expressly based upon a "jurisdictional" foundation that underlies the
community property division that is made in Idaho divorce decrees would be overturned. See
e.g., Fix v. Fix, 125 Idaho 372, 376, 870 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Ct.App.1993).
Other states, that have addressed this issue, have held that when a valid and lawful
marriage never existed in the first instance, then no subject matter jurisdiction existed in any
court to dissolve that non-existent marriage.

See e.g., Cannon v. Cannon, 677 N.E.2d 566,567

(Ind.App.1997); In the Matter ofMarriage ofJB. and HB., 326 S.W.3d 654,667
(Tex.App.201O); and Van Der Stappen v. Van Der Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Utah
App.1991).
Although the district court, on intermediate appeal, declined to directly address this issue, the
Appellant Sallaz is now directly placing that question before this Court in this appeal. In the
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absence of a valid marriage, the magistrate court simply lacks the requisite subject matter
jurisdiction to either dissolve the parties' non-existent marriage, or to determine or divide the
parties' non-existent community property. In the absence of that required subject matter
jurisdiction, any resulting judgment is void and must be declared so and vacated.

B.

The Appellant Sallaz And Respondent Baird Did Not Enter Into A Valid
Oregon Marriage That In Any Respect Ever Could Be Recognized Under
Idaho Law
Admittedly, there was a long-recognized public policy, the presumption as to the validity

of an attempted marriage, was one of the strongest presumptions known in the law. In re

Brock's Estate, 94 Idaho 111, 115,482 P.2d 86,90 (1971) (citing authorities). Subject only to
public policy exceptions, the state ofIdaho, both by statute, I.C. § 32-209, and specifically, by
common law, followed the rule that a marriage valid in the state where it was contracted is also
valid within the state ofIdaho. Hilton v. Stewart, 15 Idaho 150, 164-65,96 P. 579, 583 (1908).
On January 1, 1996 Idaho's public policy2 changed entirely as a result of the amendment
to Idaho's statutes that eliminated further recognition of common law marriages in this State.
They were abolished after January 1, 1996. See, 1995 Ida.Sess.L., ch. 104, pp. 334-36. In
addition, I.C. § 32-301 was amended by that same Act, by the inclusion of new language, the
effect of which declared that any marriage entered into in violation of the provisions of Title 32,

2

Public policy for the State of Idaho is provided by statutes, judicial decisions, and
the Idaho constitution. Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, L.L.C, 141 Idaho 185, 189, 108
P.3d 332, 336 (2005).
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Idaho Code, "shall be void." (emphasis added) (See, 1995 Ida.Sess.L., ch. 104, § 4, pg. 335. "On
and after January 1, 1996, any marriage contracted or entered into in violation of the provisions
of this title shall be void.") (emphasis added). A "void marriage" is one that is invalid from its
inception. See, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, at pg. 1062, Ninth Edition (West, 2009). When the
legislature uses the word "shall" in a statute, that usage conveys the existence of a mandatory
obligation. Twin Falls County v. Idaho Commission on Redistricting, 152 Idaho 346, 349, 271
P.3d 1202, 1205 (2012).
Six months after Idaho eliminated the recognition of common law marriages in this State,
the Appellant Sallaz and Respondent Baird, through arrangements that were only made by the
Respondent Baird, attempted to enter into a ceremonial "marriage" in Oregon on July 4, 1996,
after which they returned to Idaho to begin their life together and took up residence at the
Appellant Sallaz's home as their permanent residence. Idaho's law, on the recognition of
marriages entered into in other states, is specifically identified in I.C. § 32-209, which declares
as follows:
32-209. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN OR OUT-OF-STATE
MARRIAGES - All marriages contracted without this state, which would be
valid by the laws of the state or country in which the same were contracted,
are valid in this state, unless they violate the public policy of this state. Marriages
that violate the public policy of this state include, but are not limited to, same-sex
marriages, and marriages entered into under the laws of another state or country
with the intent to evade the prohibitions of the marriage laws of this state.
(Emphasis added).
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The presumption of a valid marriage in this case stands rebutted. There is no record of an
Oregon marriage license ever issued, either prior to the parties' attempted nuptials (ORS
106.041) or recorded in the public records following the ceremony (ORS 106.170). A search of
Oregon public records reveals there is no such license (R, pp. 281-82). When confronted with
rather similar facts, a Florida appellate court upheld a lower court's finding that a valid marriage
did not arise under Oregon law when the parties in that case did not obtain an Oregon marriage
license. Preure v. Benhadj-Djillali, 15 So.3d 877,878 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) ("Consequently,
the trial court did not err in concluding that a valid marriage did not occur under Oregon law,
given the evidence that the parties intended a purely religious ceremony and that a legal marriage
would occur later, and took no steps to obtain a marriage license, which enjoys particular
significance where Oregon's general savings clause is sought to be invoked.").
The reference to Oregon's general savings clause was to ORS 106.150(2), which
provides as follows:
All marriages, to which there are no legal impediments, solemnized before or in
any religious organization or congregation according to the established ritual or
form commonly practiced therein, are valid. In such case, the person presiding or
officiating in the religious organization or congregation shall deliver to the county
clerk who issued the marriage license the application, license and record of
marriage in accordance with ORS 106.170.
The Florida Court interpreted the "legal impediment" language of this Oregon statute as
imposing a marriage license requirement under Oregon law as a condition precedent to entering
into a valid marriage under that state's law in further reliance upon precedents of the Oregon
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appellate courts:
We conclude this savings clause is inapplicable because it presupposes the
existence of a marriage license issued by the appropriate county clerk. The lack
of a marriage license in this case was a legal impediment because the parties
neither sought nor obtained an Oregon marriage license in connection with the
2003 religious ceremony. By referencing delivery of the marriage license to the
appropriate county clerk, this statute ascribes legal significance to the existence of
such license, which itself evidences the intent of the parties to enter into a legal
marriage.
Additionally, Oregon decisional law indicates that a lawful marriage
presumes that the parties at least undertook efforts to satisfy the state's
requirements for a valid marriage, one of which is to obtain a marriage license.
Or.Rev.Stat. § 106.041 (1) (2003). See, e.g., Johnson v. Baker, 142 Or. 404, 20
P.2d 407 (1933); In re Wilmarth's Estate, 556 P.2d at 992 ....
15 So.3d at 878.
There is no reason to believe that Idaho's abolition of the recognition of "new" common
law marriages in this state, after January 1, 1996, would result in Idaho's refusal to recognize as
valid those common law marriages formed in other states, where such marriages are recognized.
Idaho never has been "hostile" to the institution of common law marriage itself. Metropolitan

Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Idaho 122, 126,645 P.2d 356, 360 (1982). But neither Oregon
(since 1925 -Huradv. McTeigh, 113 Or. 279, 295, 232 P. 658,663 (Or. 1925)), nor Idaho (since
January 1, 1996 - I.e. § 32-301) recognize newly formed common law marriages, and it would
be against Idaho public policy to recognize a common law marriage that had been formed in
either of these states, after the above-referenced dates.
Notwithstanding the strong public policy that favors the recognition of marriage, as a
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direct consequence ofIdaho's Legislative abolition of any further recognition of common law
marriage after January 1, 1996, it has been the recognized public policy of this State since that
time that any marriage entered into without a valid marriage license is absolutely void. This
result was declared in Dire v. Dire-Blodgett, 140 Idaho 777, 102 P .3d 1096 (2004), and is
consistent with the interpretation of Oregon law that was applied by the Florida Court in Preure
v. Benhadj-Djillali, 15 So.3d 877, 878 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009). In Dire, the Court unequivocally
declared this result:
"The legislature of each state has the power to control and to regulate
marriages within its jurisdiction. This includes the power to regulate the
qualifications of the contracting parties and the proceedings essential to constitute
a marriage." Duncan v. Jacobsen Constr. Co., 83 Idaho 254, 260, 360 P.2d 987,
990 (1961). By the amendments made in 1995, the Idaho legislature has clearly
required a license in order to have a valid marriage. Idaho Code § 32-201
expressly states, "Consent alone will not constitute marriage; it must be followed
by the issuance of a license and a solemnization as authorized and provided by
law." Both the issuance of the license and solemnization are required. Idaho
Code § 32-301 states, "On and after January 1, 1996, any marriage contracted or
entered into in violation of the provisions of this title shall be void." The
provisions of Title 32, Idaho Code, require both the issuance of a license and
solemnization. The duties of the officiating officer were also amended to provide
that he or she must "first require the presentation of the marriage license." Again,
that is consistent with the clear legislative intent that a marriage license is
required in order to have a valid marriage. Because the parties in this case chose
not to obtain a marriage license, their purported marriage violated the provisions
of Title 32, Idaho Code, and is therefore void. Idaho Code § 32-301. They were
never married. Therefore, the magistrate judge correctly dismissed Dire's divorce
action.
140 Idaho at 779, 102 P.3d at 1098.
Because the July 4, 1996 Sallaz-Baird marriage was not valid under Oregon law, it was
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not entitled to recognition as a valid marriage under Idaho law. I.C. § 32-209.
In the absence of a valid marriage, there was no subject matter jurisdiction in the
magistrate court to take up the action to grant a divorce to a non-existent marriage. Dire, supra.
The parties cannot consent to the court's assumption of jurisdiction through conduct or
acquiescence, nor be estopped from asserting its absence. State v. Bosier, 149 Idaho 664, 666,
239 P.3d 462, 464 (Ct.App. 2010). A judgment entered without subject matter jurisdiction is
void and can be challenged at any time, including a collateral attack. Meyers v. Hansen, 148
Idaho 283, 291, 221 P .3d 81, 89 (2009).
Relief from a void judgment is not discretionary. McClure Engineering, Inc., v. Channel

5 KlDA, 143 Idaho 950,953,155 P.3d 1189, 1192 (Ct.App.2006). Because courts are obligated
to ensure their own subject matter jurisdiction, that question must be raised and addressed "sua
sponte" by the court itself, if necessary. In re City o/Shelley, 151 Idaho 289, 294, 255 P.3d
1175,1180 (2011).

C.

The Appellant Sallaz Is Not Estopped By The Entry Of The 2005 Divorce
Decree, And Its Certification As "Final" By Issuance Of A Rule 54(b)
Certificate, From Now Challenging The Validity Of The Parties' 1996
Oregon Marriage As Based Upon The Entry Of The 2012 Community
Property Judgment
If anything, the bankruptcy trustee, as the responding party in this appeal before the

district court, and in all likelihood the only responding party before this Court, has been
persistent and dogged in his attempts to characterize this appeal as "untimely", arising from the
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July 28,2005 divorce decree itself, instead of from the January 4,2012 judgment on the
community property issues. The fact that the underlying jurisdictional basis for both judgments
a valid marriage - is the same, serves as no apparent concern to the bankruptcy trustee.
As already argued, in simplest terms, if there was no valid marriage, there never was any
community property. As an asset of the bankruptcy estate, Respondent Baird's property
interests, arising from "community property" are entirely dependent upon a valid marriage for its
very existence. As declared at the a beginning of this brief, Appellant Sallaz has already placed
before this Court, by means of pre-brief motions, the question of whether the bankruptcy trustee
has a right, not only to merely "protect" the property of the estate, but also the right to become
actively engaged as a participant in the state-law questions characterizing the property ofthe
estate, and perhaps going even further in participating in the characterization of what constitutes,
or even the creation of, property of the estate. In re Thompson, 454 B.R. 486, 491-92
(Bkrtcy.D.Idaho 2011) ("'Property of the estate' is defined broadly by § 541(a)(1) to include 'all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.' While
the question whether the interests claimed by Debtors are 'property of the estate' is a federal one
to be decided by federal law, the Court must look to state law - in this case Idaho law

to

determine whether, and to what extent, Debtors had any legal or equitable interests in property as
of the commencement of the bankruptcy case. McCarthy, Johnson & Miller v. North Bay
Plumbing, Inc. (In re Pettit), 217 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir.2000) (citing Butner v. United States,
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440 U.S. 48, 54-55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979)).").
In this matter, questions concerning the validity of the parties' marriage did not arise until
after the entry ofthe January 4,2012 judgment that created and divided the parties' "community
property" (R, pp. 216-220). Inquiries were made which revealed no Oregon marriage license
ever existed (R, pp. 281-82). The district judge, on intermediate appeal, raised the question of
why the Appellant Sallaz's suspicions were not aroused earlier, (R, pg. 351, fn. 2), to which
question he has responded in the memorandum submitted in opposition to the bankruptcy
trustee's motion to dismiss this appeal, as he relied upon the "presumption of regularity" that
otherwise attaches to such proceedings. 3 The district court ruled that Appellant Sallaz was
simply "estopped" from raising and challenging the jurisdictional basis of the magistrate court's
actions because of his own conduct, and by the passage of so much time:
Dennis is estopped from asserting before the magistrate that the divorce
decree should be granted, and then asserting here, many years later, that it was
error for the magistrate court to grant his request. See, e.g., Ross v. Ross, 103
Idaho 406, 408-09, 648 P .2d 1119, 1121-22 (1982) ("[W]e ... hold that following
3

In Idaho, as in most states, there is a recognized "presumption of regularity" in the
performance of official duties by public officers. State v. Bever, 118 Idaho 80, 83, 794 P.2d
1136,1139 (1990) ("There is a presumption of regularity in all that a court does."); and Horner
v. Ponderosa Pine Logging, 107 Idaho 1111, 1114, 695 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1985). That
presumption even extends to the performance of the office of a notary public which can be
undertaken by just about anyone qualified who posts a bond and pays the minimal fee. Farm
Bureau Finance Co., Inc. v. Carney, 100 Idaho 745, 750, 605 P.2d 509, 514 (1980). If the
individuals who solemnize marriages are considered of equal dignity, with at least a notary
public in their status in performing this particular public function, then certainly an argument
exists that a "presumption of regularity" should also attach to the performance of this particular
official duty.
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the principles of quasi estoppel plaintiff is estopped from alleging that error
occurred in the trial court's granting of the decree of divorce ... she is estopped
to deny its validity." See also Swope v Swope, 112 Idaho 974, 979, 739 P.2d 273,
278 (1987) ("In Ross we held that the wife was estopped by her conduct from
denying the finality of an uncertified partial summary judgment granting a
divorce. "). [footnote omitted]
(R, pp. 351-52).
As Appellant Sallaz has already argued in the memorandum he previously submitted to
the Court in opposition to the bankruptcy trustee's motion to dismiss this appeal, the district
court's reliance upon Ross and Swope is just inapt. In contrast to the situations presented in
those two cases, here, the effect of setting aside the parties' July 28,2005 divorce decree would
not "restore" a marital relationship, but instead would serve to confirm the fact no marriage
between Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird had ever existed!
As to the point upon which the district court relied in deciding the appeal below,
"estoppel" is not a basis upon which a court can avoid the question of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Idaho Supreme Court most recently addressed this issue in City of Eagle v. Idaho Dept. of
Water Resources, 150 Idaho 449, 247 P.3d 1037 (2011):
Estoppel is not appropriate where jurisdiction is at issue. This
Court recently explained in State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 162-63,244
P.3d 1244, 1248-49 (2010):
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a
general type or class of dispute." Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 145, 158
PJd 305,308 (2007). The source of this power comes from Article V,
Section 20, of the Idaho Constitution, which provides that district courts
"shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity, and
such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law." Idaho Const.,
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art. V, § 20. This issue is so fundamental to the propriety of a court's
actions, that subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived or consented
to, and a court has a sua sponte duty to ensure that it has subject matter
jurisdiction over a case. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(g)(4).
(Emphases added).
150 Idaho at 454, 247 P.3d at 1042.
Finally, upon the close of oral argument on appeal before the district court, Judge
Sticklen raised her own inquiry as to what she thought was an Idaho statute, which apparently
was a reference to I.C. § 32-308, in which a marriage solemnized in "full belief' of its validity
by the persons so married, cannot thereafter be questioned due to the absence of "jurisdiction or
authority." (Tr., pg. 36, L 2, to pg. 37, L. 10). Appellant in this appeal would state the question
raised by this appeal is the validity of this Oregon" marriage", and it is to be judged under
Oregon law, not Idaho law. Idaho Code § 32-308 does not apply to the facts of this case.
The guiding principles on the application of Oregon law to the validity of the parties'
marriage were set out in the analysis used by the Florida Court in Preure v. Benhadj-Djillali, 15
So.3d 877,878 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009), as set out above at pp. 28-29. Under Oregon's general
savings clause, ORS 106.150(2), the failure of the officiant at the marriage to see that the
marriage license is recorded is fatal ("the person presiding or officiating in the religious
organization or congregation shall deliver to the county clerk who issued the marriage license the
application, license and record of marriage in accordance with ORS 106.170.,,).4

4

ORS 106.170 provides:
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Report of marnage to county clerk

A person

No party to this appeal has contested the fact no Oregon marriage license exists (R, pp.
281-82). That's because none exists. Under the controlling Idaho precedent in Dire v. DireBlodgett, 140 Idaho 777, 102 P.3d 1096 (2004), the absence of a marriage license is to be the

dispositive question as to the existence of valid Idaho marriage. In sum, if there never was a
valid marriage, then there was never a marriage res over which the magistrate court ever had any
subject matter jurisdiction to decree a divorce, and ifthere was never a valid marriage, then there
was never any community property over which the magistrate court ever had any subject matter
jurisdiction to determine and divide between parties.

IV.
CONCLUSION
On the basis the magistrate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Dennis
Sallaz and Renee Baird never entered into a valid married, this Court on appeal is requested to
vacate both the January 4,2012 community property judgment, and the July 28,2005 divorce
decree upon which that community property judgment was based and derived.
Respectfully Submitted this 21st day of January, 2014.

Vernon K. Smith
Attorney for the Appellant
solemnizing a marriage shall, within 10 days after the marriage ceremony, complete the original
application, license and record of marriage form and deliver the form to the county clerk who
issued the marriage license. The person solemnizing the marriage may keep a copy of the
application, license and record of marriage form.
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